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Technology Dispute Resolution in the United States:
A Practical Perspective
Larry W. Evans*
an overused term to
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has become
describe non-litigation means of resolving disputes. I intend to provide a practical perspective of the non-litigation techniques used in the
United States to avoid costly, time-consuming, and antagonistic litigation
in resolving technology disputes.
I will begin by describing BP America, Inc., and its experience in
area, and then broadly cover the subject from the standpoint of
ADR
the
United States company. Adjudicated cases will
technology-oriented
a
not be cited here because most satisfactory non-litigation resolution of
technology disputes are not reported in legal journals or reporters.
BP America, Inc. is the successor of both the Standard Oil Company of Ohio (Sohio) and BP North America, Inc. which were merged in
1987 following BP's successful tender offer to the minority shareholders
of Sohio stock. Prior to the 1987 merger, BP owned 54% of Sohio stock.
BP America is a major U.S. corporation with assets exceeding $20 billion
and annual sales exceeding $15 billion. BP Exploration, Inc. is one of the
largest holders of proven U.S. oil reserves, and produces nearly 800,000
barrels of oil per day from wells in the United States. BP Oil refines
approximately 750,000 barrels of oil per day at five refineries, two in
Ohio, one near Philadelphia, one in Louisiana and one in northern Washington. BP Oil has over 7,500 service stations in twenty-four states. The
corporation also owns more than 100 PROCARE full-service auto centers and more than forty truck stops in those states. BP Oil is one of the
largest suppliers of aviation fuel and the largest supplier of marine fuel.
BP Chemicals owns the world's most successful chemical technology, a
process to manufacture acrylonitrile from propylene, ammonia, and air,
which was first developed in the late 1950s and has been continually upgraded. Acrylonitrile is used in synthetic fibers and plastics. Today,
nearly all of the world's acrylonitrile is produced by BP Chemicals or in
plants licensed by BP Chemicals. BP Chemicals International also owns
the leading processes for producing acetic acid and polyethylene. The
Carborundum Company is the nation's leading manufacturer of advanced ceramic parts for automotives and aerospace. Another major
business facet of BP America is animal nutrition. BP America's wholly
* Director, Corporate Patent and License Division of BP America, Inc., Vice President, BP
Chemicals, Inc., Cleveland, Ohio.
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owned subsidiary, Purina Mills, Inc., is the leading United States supplier of animal feeds.
The best ADR is one that forces (or strongly encourages) a negotiated settlement. This has been the result of most of the cases in which I
have been involved. Litigation, on the other hand, because it is so antagonistic and costly, usually discourages settlement and almost always, in
my experience, results in a decision/verdict and often in an appeal. The
longer litigation lasts, especially if extensive discovery is utilized, the
greater the cost and the higher the level of antagonism. The result is that
the parties involved in litigation are less likely to settle.
There is a school of thought that views an arbitration clause in an
agreement as a safety valve. That school teaches that the parties to the
agreement need not struggle to resolve disputes through negotiation since
they can call in a third party to resolve the dispute for them in a timely
and cost-efficient manner. The threat of litigation can be an effective inducement for conscientious negotiation. I do not subscribe entirely to
this concept, but I see its logic. A better idea, perhaps, is to require the
two parties first to attempt to negotiate a settlement. If this fails, then
permit the accused party to present its case to a senior representative of
the aggrieved party.
A brief overview of ADR techniques is in order. All disputes have
two points in common; they have a beginning and an end. In all other
respects they are very different. The gap between these two points is
bridged by dispute resolution techniques.
A successful dispute resolution technique is one which expedites the
bridging process from the beginning of the dispute to its most cost-efficient resolution. Therefore, it is important to choose a dispute resolution
technique that matches the dispute in question. An understanding of the
characteristics of the various dispute resolution techniques is necessary
before the matching process can proceed. Disputes are not static - they
change substantially as progress is made toward their resolution (see Appendices A & B for convenient matrix form summaries of dispute resolution techniques identified by the Center for Public Resources in 1982).
In late 1982, the United States Congress passed a law, 35 U.S.C.
§ 294, which provides statutory authorization for voluntary, binding arbitration of disputes concerning patent validity and patent infringement
pursuant to an agreement between the parties. This law overturned the
long-standing public policy opposing private arbitration of patent validity because of public interest.
Patent arbitrations usually are conducted by a single, skilled arbitrator with limited discovery and a fixed time schedule. The quality of a
patent arbitration decision depends upon the ability of the representatives of the parties to the dispute and the ability of the arbitrator(s). Similarly, in litigation, the attorneys and judge contribute to the quality of
the decision. The objective of patent arbitration is a high-quality, timely,
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non-antagonistic, and cost-effective result. To obtain these objectives,
both the parties and the arbitrator must be willing to assume certain burdens and risks, such as the following.
(1) The arbitrator may rule with fewer defenses or issues than are
possible in litigation.
(2) The parties must be willing to rely on limited discovery and
evidence which may not conform to traditional evidentiary
rules.
(3) The parties must accept a win/lose result without a lengthy
explanation of the basis of the decision.
(4) In binding arbitration, the parties must be willing to tolerate a
proceeding which yields'an award in which judgment may be
entered and from which there is no substantive appeal.
(5) The parties must accept the impact of an award (whether
binding or not) on subsequent proceedings.
(6) The arbitrator must be willing and able to control the course
of the proceedings, to make definitive rulings on substantive
and procedural matters and to render a clear-cut decision.
A great deal of time could be spent on patent arbitrations alone; but
patent matters, including their validity and enforceability, are now arbitrable in the United States following the enactment of the 1983 law. (See
Appendix C for the text of 35 U.S.C. § 294).
My personal experience in litigation and non-litigation dispute resolution has been reasonably extensive. Two illustrative examples follow.
One involves an international technology license, and the other, a patent
and trade secret dispute. The international license provided for arbitration under the Rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. The patent and trade secret dispute was arbitrated as a result of an agreement
reached between the parties after the substance of the dispute had been
identified.
The license agreement was between Sohio and an organization in
East Germany. Under the license, which was entered into in the late
1960s, the licensee received as a part of its license the right to manufacture Sohio's highly proprietary catalyst for its own use and to use the
catalyst in our proprietary process. The licensee's catalyst manufacturing right was limited to a specific catalyst and only for its own use, i.e.,
not for sale to others. Some years after the original license was signed,
Sohio developed a new, improved catalyst which was offered for sale to
the licensee. The licensee showed enough interest to obtain a sample of
the catalyst under a non-analysis agreement and under the strict secrecy
terms of the original license, but ultimately elected not to purchase it.
Two or three years later, we realized that our other Eastern European
licensees were not purchasing the catalyst from us. Upon investigation,
we obtained a sample of a catalyst being offered for sale by a sister organization of our licensee and discovered it was a crude copy of our new
catalyst. It was obvious that the licensee had reverse-engineered our new
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catalyst. It was only able to do this because it had access to our information relating to the manufacture of the earlier catalyst and to our process
for using the catalyst. Even so, its version was, at best, a crude copy,
albeit better than the earlier catalyst it was licensed to manufacture.
Once we became aware of the licensee's activities, we attempted to
resolve the dispute through friendly discussion. This proved impossible
because, no matter how friendly we became, a substantial sum of money
had to change hands. The Communist government had not planned for
this payment, and thus, it could not be tendered unless a third party (in
this case, the Arbitration Board) required them to make the payment.
As a result, we were forced to bring an arbitration proceeding in order to
resolve the dispute.
The agreement which was signed in the late 1960s provided for arbitration to be conducted under the Rules of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce. These rules are very similar to other international arbitration rules in that they provide that each party may appoint an arbitrator.
The two arbitrators which are appointed by the parties then select a third
neutral arbitrator who assumes the role of president of the arbitration
panel. In the late 1960s, Sweden had emerged as a desirable location for
resolving east-west trade disputes because of its supposed neutrality. The
arbitration in this case, however, was never conducted in Stockholm,
probably because of the tax laws of Sweden. Rather, sessions were conducted in Paris, Frankfurt and Vienna. Although the arbitration clause
did not indicate a site for the arbitration, it did provide that the English
language and New York law would be utilized by the arbitrators. The
usual surety bonds and costs to be paid by the parties were provided as
well.
Only after it was clear that the arbitrators were going to decide in
our favor were the East Germans able or willing to negotiate. The final
negotiation was conducted just before the arbitrators were scheduled to
meet to determine the amount of our reward. I am convinced that the
settlement we received was actually higher than the award we would
have been given by the arbitrators. In other words, the East Germans
paid a premium to achieve a resolution that could be represented to their
unsophisticated Communist bosses as a "business" solution.
In retrospect, this arbitration, as well as others which BP has experienced under the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, offered significant advantages in time and money over litigation. The
biggest advantages, in my experience, were that through arbitration we
could be assured of a neutral decision maker, and the arbitration environment did not promote the kind of antagonism which is usually experienced in litigation. In fact, we have remained quite friendly with our
opponent even after they made a preposterous presentation of how they
were able to duplicate our catalyst through purely "independent" work.
The patent and trade secret arbitration was between BP America
and a friendly United States competitor. The competitor alleged that one
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of its former employees had been hired by BP to duplicate one of its
products so that BP could compete with the competitor. Moreover, it
alleged that the manufacture and sale of our product infringed upon two
or three of its patents.
Patent litigation too often results in an expenditure of several millions of dollars either to prosecute or defend. For example, BP is currently involved in a patent litigation which has lasted for more than ten
years with more than $4 million spent to date.
In this case, neither BP nor our competitor had a business that
could justify this kind of expenditure; but indeed, the business was important enough to cause us to want to resolve our dispute. Very early in
our negotiations we decided to institute a binding arbitration utilizing a
single arbitrator agreeable to both of us. The arbitrator, with our help,
would decide upon the procedural rules for the arbitration, i.e., the
amount of discovery and testimony, and the issues to be resolved. We
also agreed upon cost. In this case, the plaintiff was to bear costs up to a
specific amount, and all costs over that amount would be shared between
the parties. Another unique aspect of the agreement was that we agreed
to waive our patent validity defenses in return for their agreement to
waive damages as a remedy. That is, our worst case result would be that
we would stop infringing, stop using their trade secrets and return any
notebooks, reports, etc., that the former employee brought with him.
The results of this arbitration were of very high quality. The decision maker was an experienced patent judge from the Court of Claims,
and the two parties cooperated very well in meeting all of the arbitrator's
requirements. Costs were very low, less than 10% of the cost of litigation, and a decision on two very complex issues was reached. The arbitration was accomplished within a ten month span; if the parties had
wanted, it could have been accomplished much more quickly. The nonantagonistic environment provided for many mutually agreed delays.
A procedure which appears to have considerable merit is illustrated
language in Appendices D and E. In this procedure, in the event
the
by
the accusing party first affords the accused party an oppordispute,
of a
tunity to meet so that each party may present its position to a senior
authorized representative of the other party in an attempt to reach an
amicable resolution. Details of the presentation are provided, including
the opportunity to utilize a neutral legal advisor. It is required that this
procedure take place before either party avails itself of other legal remedies. Such a procedure provides an opportunity for a negotiated settlement which is more likely to be equitable than a decision reached by a
third party who does not have as much information available to him as
the senior executives. Additionally, this procedure would minimize the
antagonism that inevitably results from litigation.
Last year, I participated in a study, conducted by Albany Law
School for the National Institute for Dispute Resolution, which concerned the management of disagreement in emerging high-technology
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businesses. Copies of the entire report or of its executive summary can
be obtained from Albany Law School. In the report, several concerns of
disagreement management were identified. These elements included
damage to relationships, monetary cost and loss of key personnel time.
Also, the potential for loss of confidentiality of details of the dispute was
noted. The themes expressed by representatives from some twenty-seven
large companies are reflected in the following paragraphs.
Importance of Relationships
The impact of disagreement upon relationships with customers, suppliers, and others with whom business is transacted was repeatedly
voiced, to a greater or lesser extent, as a major concern to the large corporations. One executive stated that his company is predisposed to avoid
litigation, refering to litigation as a "game that's not worth it." The industry represented by this individual enjoys a unique marketplace which
relies on continuing close relationships with a limited number of customers. This has required that his company take great care to avoid alienation, and perhaps has occasionally been taken advantage of as a result.
This company works hard to develop mutual trust with its customers.
Although not referring to it as ADR, the executive recounted that one
approach successfully used when a dispute arises is to assemble a negotiating team of sales, manufacturing, technology, and management personnel to examine the problem. It was specifically noted that legal
representation was not included at this time. This particular company
has very few occurances of litigation. An interesting characteristic of
this company is that it has very few lawyers in its management structure
and relies solely on external counsel, even though it is a highly successful
company with thirty-four plants in twelve countries. A similar pattern
emerges in its relationship with its suppliers, consisting of large reputable
companies also anxious to remain on good terms with their customers.
Another individual, representing an even larger corporation, spoke
of his industry as one which has also experienced less litigation than
most. He felt that this was attributable in part to a recognition that relationships are particularly important in an industry such as his which traditionally has had many points of contact with its competitors. This has
encouraged cooperative management of disagreements within antitrust
constraints.
Efficiency Considerations
As was expected, efficiency factors were continuously voiced as major high-level management concerns. One executive spoke of frequently
accepting settlements that were unsatisfactory in order to avoid expending management and staff time to litigate. In this particular company,
internal counsel was given authority to settle any disputes involving less
than $100,000, and this was done with limited or no direct involvement
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by other management. The response to the dispute was directly related
to the degree of exposure.
Importance of Confidentiality
Confidentiality was mentioned as a concern, particularly with respect to disagreements involving intellectual property issues. Protective
orders and "in camera" court proceedings are not terribly effective in
preserving confidentiality.
The large companies who participated in the study had mixed feelings about ADRs. Most opposed binding arbitration. Many felt that
traditional arbitration rules are often abused and that the lack of judicial
supervision often allows the resolution process to get further out of control than it would have had the dispute been litigated. They felt that
binding arbitration is often "baby splitting," resulting in poor, non-appealable decisions.
Most of the company representatives expressed support for negotiated settlements. The best ADR is one which uses skilled negotiation
between attorneys, with principalsinvolved. Involvement of senior executives increases candor and cooperation and reduces adversarial
posturing.
A non-destructive ADR process, however, such as negotiation,
stands the best chance of preserving corporate relationships. When legitimate questions of fact are present, mini-trials, meditations, summary
jury trials, and non-binding arbitration often facilitate settlement. There
remain, however, some areas that are best handled by litigation, e.g., antitrust, products liability, and unfair competition.
In all cases, the importance of senior management involvement at an
early stage was viewed to be very helpful because it affords an opportunity to avoid prematurely hardened positions.
It is clear from the Albany study that receptivity of non-litigation
methods of resolving disputes is growing among U.S. companies. Perhaps the need for increased global competitiveness is causing businesses
to seek ways to conserve money and time. Additionally, as court dockets
become more crowded, lower-quality decisions result. A possible exception is the patent area in which the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, since its establishment in 1982, has led to an improvement of
court decisions in this area. The traditional belief that the party with the
strongest case prefers litigation and the weaker prefers arbitration is
changing somewhat. Today, both sides realize the inherent difficulties of
litigation and the potential strengths of arbitration.
To summarize, any process which tends to preserve rather than destroy relationships to reduce time and cost and results in a high-quality
resolution is preferred in U.S. technology disputes. Well-conceived
ADRs, using qualified mediators/arbitrators/neutral advisors, seems to
offer the best potential for attaining the desired result.
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APPENDIX A
COIPARISON OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES'
"Hybrid" Dispute Resolution Processes
PRI VAlE
JUDGING
Volunry

NEUTRAL EXPERT
FACT FINDING

Binding but subject

Nonbinding but
results may be
admissible

Binding on.
nonbinding

Party~selected
third-party decisionmaker. may have to
be former judge
or lawyer

Third- party

Judg. other judge.
or third.party neutral
selected by parties

Staruory procedure
(see.eg. Cal
Code Civ. Proc §638
eseq but highly

Informal

Informal. off-the-record

Opportunity for
each party to present
roofs supporting
ecision in its favor

Investigatory

Presentation of proofs
may
or may not be
allowed

Winlose result
(judgment of court)

Report or
testimony

Mutually acceptable
aseement sought;
binding conference
is similar to arbitration

Findings of fact
and conclusions of
law possible but
not required

May influence
result or
settlement

Agreement usually
embodied in contract
or release

Adherence to
norms, laws. and
precedent

Emphasis on
reliable fact
determination

Emphasis on resolving
the dispute

Private process
unless judicial
enforcement sought

May be highly
private or
closed in court

Private process but
may be discovered

to appeal and
possibly review
trial court

Voluntary or
nonvoluntary
under FRE 706

neutral with specializedsubject matter
expertise may
be selected by
the parties

SETTLEMENT
CONFERENCE
Voluntary or
mandatory

flexibl as to timing.

place, and procedures

'Rep-n.d with pereusson fro- Corpoate Margement 1982 by Center far Pubhc Reource-CPJ?.
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APPENDIX B
COMPARISON OF DISPUTE RFSOLUTION PROCESSES'
MEDIAriONI

"rRADITIONAL

ARBITRATION
Voluntary unless
contractual or
court centered
Binding
(usuallyl

CONCI1ATION
Voluntary

NEGOTIATION
Voluntary

Nonbinding

Imposed. thirdparty neutral
decision-maker
with no specialized expertise
in dispute
subject

Party-selected
third-party
decision-maker,
usually with
specialized
subject expertise

Party-selected
outside facilitator. often
with specialized subject
expertise

Nonbinding
(except through
use of adjudication
to enforce agreement)
No thiod-party
facilitator

Nonbinding
(except through
use of adjudication
to enforce agreement)
Third.party
neutral advisor
often with
specialized subject expertise

Highly procedural
formalized and
highly structured
by predetermined.
rigid rules

Procedurally less
formal: procedural
roles and substantive law may be
set by parties

Usually informal.
unstructured

Usually informal
unstructured

Opportunity for
each party to
present proofs
supporting decision in its favor

Opportunity for
each party to
present proofs
supporting decision in its favor

Presentation of
proofs less important than
attitudes of each
party; may include
principled
argument

Presentation of
proofs usually
indirect or nonexistent: may
include principled
argument

Less formal than
adjudication and
arbitration but
procedural rules
and scope of issues
may be set by the
parties and
implemented by
neutral advisor
Opportunity and
responsibility
to present proofs
supporting resuit in its favor

Win/lose result

Compromise resuit possible
(probable'l
Reason for resuIt not usually
required

Mutually acceptable agreement
sought
Agreement usually
embodied in contract or release

Mutually acceptable agreement
sought
Agreement usually
embodied in contract or release

ADJUI)ICATION
Non-Voluntary
Binding

Expectation of
reasoned statement
for particular
interest
Process emphasizes
attaining substantive consistency and predictability of
results
Public process;
lack of privacy
of submissions
*Reprinted with permission

Emphasis on disEmphasis on disConsistency and
putasts" relaputants' relapredictability
tionship, not on
tionship. not on
balanced against
adherence to or
or
adherence to
concern for disdevelopment of
development of
putants" relaconsistent roles
consistent rules
tionship
Highly private
Private process
Private process
process
unless judicial
enforcement sought
Dispute Management 1982 byCenter for Public P.esources-CPR.
from Corporate

MINI-TRIAL
Voluntary

Mutually acceptable agreement
sought
Agreement usually
embodied in contract or release
Emphasis on sound.
cost-elfective
and fair resolution satisfactory
to both parties
Highly private
process
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APPENDIX C

35 U.S.C. §294
Voluntary Arbitration
(a) A contract involving a patent or any right under a patent may
contain a provision requiring arbitration of any dispute relating to patent
validity or infringement arising under the contract. In the absence of
such a provision, the parties to an existing patent validity or infringement
dispute may agree in writing to settle such dispute by arbitration. Any
such provision or agreement shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable,
except for any grounds that exist at law or in equity for revocation of a
contract.
(b) Arbitration of such disputes, awards by arbitrators and confirmation of awards shall be governed by Title 9, United States Code, to the
extent such title is not inconsistent with this section. In any such arbitration proceeding, the defenses provided for under Section 282 of this title
shall be considered by the arbitrator if raised by any party to the
proceeding.
(c) An award by an arbitrator shall be final and binding between the
parties to the arbitration but shall have no force or effect on any other
person. The parties to an arbitration may agree that, in the event a patent which is the subject matter of an award is subsequently determined to
be invalid or unenforceable in a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction from which no appeal can or has been taken, such award
may be modified by any court of competent jurisdiction upon application
by any party to the arbitration. Any such modification shall govern the
rights and obligations between such parties from the date of such
modification.
(d) When an award is made by an arbitrator, the patentee, his assignee or licensee shall give notice thereof in writing to the Commissioner. There shall be a separate notice prepared for each patent
involved in such proceeding. Such notice shall set forth the names and
addresses of the parties, the name of the investor and the name of the
patent owner, shall designate the number of the patent and shall contain
a copy of the award. If an award is modified by a court, the party requesting such modification shall give notice of such modification to the
Commissioner. Commissioner shall, upon receipt of either notice, enter
the same in the record of the prosecution of such patent. If the required
notice is not filed with the Commissioner, any patent to the proceeding
may provide such notice to the Commissioner.
(e) The award shall be unenforceable until the notice required by
subsection (d) is received by the Commissioner. (Added August 27,
1982, Public Law 97-247, Section 17(b)(1), 96 Stat. 322.)
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D

Dispute Resolution
Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary herein contained, any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or breach thereof shall be settled first by presentation of the
positions of each party being made to the authorized representatives of
the other party (non-lawyers) in the presence of an agreed-upon neutral
legal advisor, if desired, so that such representatives may confer with
each other in an endeavor to amicably resolve the dispute. If the parties
are unable to agree, the dispute shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association or such
other rules as it may designate. Any arbitration proceeding shall be held
in Houston, Texas, U.S.A. This arbitration agreement shall be enforceable and judgment upon any award rendered by all or a majority of arbitrators may be entered in any court of any country having jurisdiction,
and such award shall be final and binding upon the parties.
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E

Dispute Resolution
In the event of any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or
relating to this Agreement which may give rise to litigation or termination of the Agreement, it is hereby agreed that no such action shall be
taken unless the party intending to take such action first affords the other
party an opportunity to meet so that each party may present its position
to a senior authorized representative of the other in an endeavor to reach
an amicable resolution of the matter.
Either party may initiate the meeting by giving written notice to the
other of the controversy and its desire to convene a meeting pursuant to
these provisions specifying five (5) dates for the meeting, no earlier than
ten (10) days after receipt of such notice by the other party nor later than
twenty (20) days after such notice is received. The notice shall also specify the name and title of the senior representative who will attend the
meeting. The receiving party shall within five (5) days of receipt of such
notice notify the initiating party in writing of the name and title of its
senior representative and select one of the days so specified for the meetoffices in
ing. Any such meeting shall be held either at - or at -as elected by the initiating party. The senior representatives so selected shall be businessmen not directly involved in the controversy. Attorneys shall not be used as the representative.
If the parties so desire, they may agree on a neutral legal advisor to
attend such meeting and give whatever legal advice or advisory opinions
as are requested of him by either party. The costs for such legal advisor
is to be borne equally by the parties.
Each party shall be given equal time at the meeting to make an uninterrupted presentation of its position to the senior representatives of both
parties in whatever manner such party deems advisable, including oral
presentations by attorneys, experts or by written documentation or visual
aids. The parties shall then be given equal time to rebut the presentation
of the other party, ask questions of its witnesses or clarify its position.
Rebutted presentations and the questioning of all witnesses shall be done
by the businessmen and not by their attorneys.
At the conclusion of the presentation and rebuttal period, the senior
representatives of each party together with the neutral legal advisor, if
any, shall attempt to negotiate a resolution. No attorneys except for the
neutral advisor shall be present during this negotiating session. The senior representatives may agree to extend such negotiations to another
day or location. The neutral legal advisor may render non-binding opinions assessing the strength and weaknesses of each party's case. No record shall be made of the proceeding.
If the parties are unable to reach agreement at said meeting or any
extensions thereof, the parties shall be free to avail themselves of their
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legal remedies, including but not by way of limitation, litigation and termination of the Agreement, but at their own risk.

